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Utilitarianism, Game Theory, and the Social
Contract
Daniel Burgess
I.

Introduction

One of the long-standing debates in the field of
ethics has to do with the ethical system of utilitarianism.
Ethicists have argued for over a century about the
feasibility, applicability, and the possible results of the
implementation of such a system. But this wideranging debate over the entire system of utilitarianism
often overshadows a debate which exists between
utilitarians themselves. Some utilitarians feel that the
best method of ethics is one which evaluates individual
actions based upon their consequences. Others feel that
utilitarianism should focus on finding and codifying the
rules which, when universally applied, result in the
greatest amount of good for the greatest number. It is
this debate, the debate between act- and rule-utilitarians,
which I wish to highlight and expound upon in this
paper.
It is well-established by now that any attempt to
universalize decisions made by purely act-utilitarian
criteria may have disastrous results,21 and it is not my
purpose in this paper to rehash generally accepted
arguments. However, when confronted with these
critiques, many act-utilitarians rally around the fact that
these overall disadvantages in utility caused by the
universalization of act-utilitarian decisions are
outweighed by the numerous occasions in which an actutilitarian framework produces more desirable
immediate consequences than does a rule-utilitarian
21

Hunter, D. “Act utilitarianism and dynamic deliberation.”
Erkenntnis 41 (1994): 11-12.
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system.22 Though this may be correct in certain cases, I
will show that in a certain class of cases, act-utilitarian
decision procedures result in an overall level of utility
that is far inferior to that which would be achieved
through the use of a rule-utilitarian decision procedure.
Through the use of game theory and a game-theoretical
model of the social contract, I will demonstrate that in
the class of non-communicative games with multiple
optimal equilibria, utilization of rule-utilitarian decision
procedures is actually immediately superior to the use
of act-utilitarian decision procedures. I will then
discuss the importance of games of this type to the field
of prescriptive ethics as a whole.
I.

Definitions

Before I begin my analysis it is necessary to
clarify a few terms. First, by utilitarian I mean a
person who, when evaluating a choice of possible
decisions or actions, believes the correct choice to be
that which will result in the greatest attainment of good
for the greatest number of people. In this definition I
make no claims about what this good should be
considered to be. In fact, for the purposes of analysis in
this paper, what exactly constitutes the good is
completely irrelevant. I have used the general term
happiness, but replacing “happiness” with “pleasure,”
“satisfied preferences,” or “actualized mental states”
would cause no inconsistency in my argument. So long
as one accepts that there is such a thing as a good which
we should seek to maximize, my argument remains
valid.
For act- and rule-utilitarianism, I will be using
the definitions offered by Binmore. By act-utilitarian I
22

Mackie, J. L. “The disutility of act-utilitarianism.”
Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973): 289-300.
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mean one who “argues that each individual act should
maximize the common good.”23 By rule-utilitarian I
mean one who “argues that utilitarian principles should
be applied to the rules to which we appeal when making
decisions.” 24 While there are interesting ethical
disputes about the exact nature of the difference
between rule-utilitarianism and deontological systems
of ethics like that of Immanuel Kant, it is not my
purpose in this paper to discuss the differences between
deontology and consequentialism. I am only attempting
to differentiate between act- and rule-utilitarianism.
Finally, game theory is defined as “the study of
the ways in which strategic interactions among rational
players produce outcomes with respect to the
preferences (or utilities) of those players.” 25
Equilibrium for a particular game is the stable
combination of choices and subsequent results which
follow directly from a rational evaluation of the aspects
of the game based on certain underlying assumptions.
The only underlying assumptions made in this paper are
those constraining the decision procedures of the
players of the game and the predetermined rules of the
game itself. A decision procedure is the method by
which players evaluate what constitutes a beneficial
outcome of the game. The two decision procedures
explored are an act-utilitarian procedure and a ruleutilitarian procedure. A strategy is a general theory of
action stemming from the decision procedure of a
player. A strategy is said to be optimal insofar as it
produces the best possible result. With that, let the
games begin!

23

Binmore, K. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. p. 161.
24
Ibid. p. 161.
25
“Game theory.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Online).
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II.

The Driving Game

Jerry
Right
Left

For an example of a game which illustrates the
difference between act- and rule-utilitarian decision
procedures, let’s stay as simple as possible. The game
described below will have but two players, each having
only two possible choices. The game is far simpler
than most such games in the real world, but the
concepts illustrated within can be extrapolated into
more complex situations quite easily. Before we begin
the game, we have to make certain assumptions about
its nature. These assumptions constitute the rules by
which the game is played:
1) Both players must use the same decision
procedure.
2) Both players are rational decision-makers.
3) Both players are able to accurately predict the
outcome of a given combination of actions.
4) Both players are aware of the first three
assumptions.
Tom and Jerry are our two players. Each one is driving
toward the other on a road at night, and the road is just
wide enough for both cars to pass one another safely.
As the two cars approach one another, each driver has a
choice: veer to the left or veer to the right. The range
of possible outcomes for this exchange is illustrated by
the decision matrix below:
Tom
Left
Right
1

-5

-5

1
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For the purposes of this diagram, we will measure the
outcome of the event in terms of the total amount of
happiness received by the two participants.26 In this
paper all outcomes will be measured in terms of total
utility received by all participants of the game without
reference to the individual levels of utility caused by
each outcome. In this case, the pair receives 1 unit of
happiness either when both participants veer to the left
or when both participants veer to the right, causing the
two cars to pass one another without incident. When
one participant veers right as the other veers left,
however, the cars crash, causing a general level of
unhappiness five times more intense than the happiness
experienced with an uneventful ride.27
III.

Act-utilitarian Decision Procedures

Let us suppose that Tom is an act-utilitarian, which
means that under assumption 1, so is Jerry. Tom knows
that the best possible outcome will come from both
drivers either choosing left or choosing right, and
assumes that Jerry will come to this conclusion as well.
As an act-utilitarian, what should Tom do?
The plain and simple truth is that Tom has no
idea, and neither do we. This is because the game
which Tom is playing has multiple equilibria. If there
were only one optimal resolution to the game being
played, Tom would have no trouble choosing the action
26

Again, it is important to note that the actual type of “good”
represented in this matrix is immaterial. Replace “happiness” with
“satisfied preferences” and you’ll get the same result.
27
It could be argued that the decision I have chosen to analyze is
not a moral one. It is not my purpose in this paper to debate what
decisions do and do not constitute morality. I will simply state that
it is quite easy to imagine a situation similar to the one described
above that could be widely recognized as being “moral” in nature,
and that I have chosen the driving game merely for its simplicity
and its universality.
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that would lead to that optimal resolution, and would be
able to assume that Jerry, a fellow act-utilitarian, would
do the same. However, in this game there are two
optimal solutions, and each solution requires a different
choice from Tom. The result of both players choosing
right is just as good as the result of both players
choosing left. If Tom chooses to go right, he faces a ½
probability that Jerry will also go right, and that a
favorable outcome will result. But he also faces a ½
probability that Jerry will choose left, and that a
thoroughly unfavorable outcome will come about. The
same ½-½ ratio results if Tom chooses to go left. Tom
has no good reason, as an act-utilitarian, to choose one
over the other, and neither does Jerry. If the two
players could communicate, then there would be a
chance that the situation could be resolved in a
mutually beneficial manner. However, this situation
precludes the possibility of communication, and each
participant in the game has to choose based on nothing
but his rational judgment. Given that act-utilitarianism
does not suggest right over left or vice versa, Tom must
choose, in effect, randomly. Jerry, being a rational
agent with the same decision process as Tom, makes
the same choice. So the strategy which results from an
act-utilitarian decision procedure is that both players
choose randomly.28 So the result for Tom is that half of
the time he passes Jerry uneventfully, and half of the
time the two end up exchanging insurance info on the
side of the road. Clearly this is problematic. Not only
is this not the best possible outcome for the game being
played, but it is markedly inferior to the actual result of
this game that we play hundreds of times every day. In
this case at least, a strategy stemming from an act-

28

Binmore, K. “Reciprocity and the social contract.” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 7.
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utilitarian decision procedure produces results that are
far less than optimal.
IV.

Rule-utilitarian Decision Procedures

Let us change things around a bit and assign a
rule-utilitarian decision procedure to both players. Just
as before, Tom enters the game looking for an optimal
strategy given his decision procedure, and just as before,
he finds one. However, the optimal strategy for the
rule-utilitarian differs greatly from the optimal strategy
for the act-utilitarian. Looking at the decision matrix,
Tom sees that the best outcomes occur when both he
and Jerry choose the same side. Included in his
decision procedure is the caveat that in order for a
strategy to be optimal, it must be universally applicable
for this type of situation. Given this caveat, Tom
reasons as follows:
if I choose right, then
universalizing that choice means that Jerry must choose
right. And if we both choose to veer right then we miss
each other and the best possible solution comes about.
Tom therefore comes to the conclusion that the rule
“always choose right,” becomes the optimal strategy
because its universalization means that Jerry must
follow it as well. He is correct to reason that “always
choose right” is the optimal strategy for this particular
game. If this optimal strategy is followed by both
players, then no accidents ever occur between the two
and a far better overall outcome is achieved than that
which follows from act-utilitarian reasoning.
However, there are still problems with the ruleutilitarian decision procedure that Tom utilizes.
Remember that one of the restrictions to this class of
games is that the two players cannot communicate.
Because of this fact, Tom has to make a very suspect
leap when deducing the optimal strategy for this game.
He has to assume that Jerry will also come to the
79

conclusion that “always choose right” is the rule to
follow. However, given that this game has multiple
equilibria, this is not always the case. A rule which
may appear just as attractive to Jerry as “always choose
right” is the rule “always choose left.” Jerry may
reason that the universalization of this second rule
would also lead to no crashes between the two players,
which is the best possible outcome. What happens
when the two players decide to model their strategies
after different but equally optimal rules? In this case,
the two players will always crash, which is an even
worse outcome than that offered through an actutilitarian analysis of the game. So in the end, unless
something about the game is changed, the Nash
equilibrium for the two games is exactly the same. Half
of the time the two rule-utilitarian players will both
choose either “always choose left” or “always choose
right” as their rule, but the other half of the time they
will choose opposite rules to universalize. So, just like
act-utilitarians, rule-utilitarians will crash half of the
time if not allowed to communicate. Something more
is needed before we can call rule-utilitarianism a true
optimal strategy.
Tom must have a reasonable
expectation that Jerry will choose the same optimal
strategy before Tom’s implementation of this strategy
will eliminate all crashes.
This reasonable expectation cannot be arrived at
through discussion, as the game is rigged so that the
two players cannot discuss what choice the other is
going to make. However, it can be arrived at through
other means.
V.

The Social Contract

My contention is that this situation can be
resolved in an optimal manner by an appeal to the
social contract. The particular form of contractarianism
80

to which I am referring is not the more traditional view
ascribed to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, but rather
the more recent 20th-century conception espoused by
John C. Harsanyi and John Rawls. Both Harsanyi and
Rawls argue for an idea of the social contract as
stemming from a rational agreement by the interested
parties. Both Rawls and Harsanyi argued that behind a
“veil of ignorance,” a rational agent would agree to
cede power to a government given that the methods of
distribution used by the government were consistent
with a rational principle. Rawls felt that this rational
principle was the “maximin principle,” while Harsanyi
argued for a “preference utilitarianism principle.” 29
Both principles have been critiqued at length in the
philosophical literature, and my purpose in this paper is
not to debate the merits of one principle over another.
Rather, I wish to suggest that the social contract can
more adequately be framed within the contexts of game
theory and utilitarianism. My thinking in this area is
similar to that of Ken Binmore:
I think game theory has two major lessons for a putative
science of moral behavior. The first is that a social
contract can be usefully understood as the set of
commonly understood conventions that allow the
citizens of a society to coordinate on one of the many
equilibria in their game of life. The second is that…a
much wider range of behavior [is] supported as an
equilibrium in repeated games than is generally
30
thought.”

29

Weirich, P. “A Game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and
maximin rules of social choice.” Erkenntnis 28 (1988): 117-133;
Harsanyi, J. C. “Rule utilitarianism and decision theory.”
Erkenntnis 11 (1977): 25-53.
30
Binmore, K. “Reciprocity and the social contract.” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 5-6.
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If we view the human experience as the sum total of a
number of different games that we play each and every
day, then the social contract functions effectively as a
means of suggesting the correct outcomes of those
games. When a game, such as that outlined above, has
multiple equilibria, it is the purpose of the social
contract to mediate between the two competing
equilibria and promote one over the other. This can
happen in a wide number of ways. When the game
being played is of little significance in the grand
scheme of things, the social contract may manifest itself
in the form of social conventions or habits. However,
when an improper conclusion to the game being played
may jeopardize the safety or life of the participants, it
becomes necessary for someone to forcibly implement
the social contract. This usually comes in the form of
laws issued and enforced by the government. The
purpose of the government, then, is to firmly establish
those rules to be followed by citizens which will result
in the greatest number of fulfilled equilibria for the
various dangerous games that we play. These rules are
by no means set in stone, and may be changed if doing
so would allow the participants in the game of life to
fulfill more or greater equilibria.
VI.

The Driving Game Revisited

Clearly, the game of driving is one in which a
dangerous outcome is probable without the proper rules
being followed. Given that, we can utilize this gametheoretical approach to the social contract to ensure that
one of the two possible optimal equilibria in the game is
universalized. In America, we universalize the rule of
“always choose right.” Of course, in other countries,
such as Britain, the rule “always choose left,” is
universalized. The specific rule which is universalized
is immaterial; what is important is that the participants
82

of the game understand what rule is to be universalized
and have a reasonable expectation that other players
will choose to follow the same rule as they do.
Assuming that the driving game mentioned above is
being played in America, Tom now has a reasonable
expectation that Jerry will choose to follow the statemandated rule of “always choose right.” Given that this
is the rule which he can reasonably expect Jerry to
universalize, Tom now chooses to universalize “always
choose right” as well. The end result of the game with
the addition of this contractarian assumption is that the
best possible outcome will now almost always occur,
and that the rule-utilitarian approach yields preferable
results.
However, one could point out that the changes
we have enacted in the revisited driving game are just
as applicable to act-utilitarianism as to ruleutilitarianism. However, there is a fundamental problem
in applying the constraints listed above to a system in
which all the players are act-utilitarian. Recall that one
of the advantages of a social contract listed above is
that the participants of the game have a reasonable
expectation that other players will choose to follow the
same rule as they do. There is no inconsistency in
applying this maxim to a game in which all participants
are rule-utilitarians, because, by the very definition of
rule-utilitarianism, every rule-utilitarian will follow
those rules which he or she knows will produce the
optimal outcome when universally applied, regardless
of the circumstances of the game. An act-utilitarian has
no such restriction. Perhaps the most fundamental
difference between an act-utilitarian and a ruleutilitarian is that the act-utilitarian is free to break a rule
which is most beneficial when universally applied,
whenever the act-utilitarian deems it to be in the best
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interest of all people involved to break the rule. 31
Given this fundamental difference between actutilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, it is my contention
that act-utilitarianism is incompatible with the form of
the social contract outlined above because in a system
in which all participants are act-utilitarian, there can be
no reasonable certainty that a player will follow the rule
necessary for the optimal resolution of the game, and
because the players will not always choose the optimal
strategy. Because no such inconsistency exists when all
players utilize rule-utilitarian strategies, that system of
ethics is optimal in games of this type.
It could (and has) been argued that given the
simplicity of the game I have set up, there is no possible
reason for an act-utilitarian to stray from conventional
driving behavior because there is no reason to believe
that doing so would be to anyone’s benefit. To this I
respond that, while this is the case in the simplest of
games, it is easy to imagine a slightly more complex
game for which this is not true. For example, let’s put
both Tom and Jerry at a bar. Both of them are
convinced that they can consume vast amounts of
alcohol in order to have a smashingly good time
without this affecting their motor skills in any way.
Needless to say, they are incorrect. A rule-utilitarian
would immediately recognize that the optimal strategy
in this game is to refrain from drinking. An actutilitarian could quite easily reason that the universal
rule of “don’t drink and drive” is optimal when applied
to everyone, but could also conclude that he is an
exception due to his tolerance. Given this, in the more
complex game described above, act-utilitarian Tom will
31

See Carlson, G. “Plans, expectations, and act-utilitarian
distrust.” Philosophical Studies 36 (1979): 295-300; Freedman, B.
“A meta-ethics for professional morality.” Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19;
Lyons, D. Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 1965.
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not always follow the optimal strategy, and can have no
certainty that act-utilitarian Jerry will follow the
optimal strategy either. In this case, then, the social
contract as defined above and a prescriptive actutilitarian system of ethics are incompatible.
VII.

Objections

The most obvious objection to the situation
present above deals with the restrictions placed upon
the actors. Specifically, the driving game as was
framed above greatly confined the players’ knowledge
and opportunities for cooperation by prohibiting them
from communicating. In real life, one might argue, we
are not prevented from communicating from those with
whom we play games. We can talk to them and discuss
which set of choices might result in the best overall
outcome. Therefore, while the driving example above
might be illustrative of a given case, this case is rare
and contrived enough that the arguments applicable in
this situation are not applicable to the entirety of the
range of choices available to members of a society.
I am willing to concede that the above situation
is a particular case, but it belongs to a class of cases
which I feel have a great deal of importance in the field
of prescriptive ethics. Because of the vastness of our
cities, the increasing influence of mass media, and the
growing world population, it is becoming more and
more difficult every day to have meaningful
interactions with those with whom we do not already
have a prior relationship. The important point here is
not that the above class of games relates only to those
cases in which it is impossible to communicate with the
others playing, but also to those cases in which it is
infeasible to do so. Every day we are confronted by a
multitude of situations in which we could take the time
to communicate with other actors in order to mutually
85

consent to the best possible combination of actions, but
we choose not to because of constraints upon our time
and resources. The game of driving is but one of the
situations in which an optimal outcome could be arrived
at through cooperative deliberation; however, in this
game and in many others we defer to rules to save time,
because no one wants to spend their driving time
shouting out directions to every other person on the
road. Life is filled with situations of this type, and ruleutilitarianism, when conjoined with a game-theoretic
model of the social contract, can ensure that the optimal
equilibria to the many impersonal games that we play
everyday will occur.
VIII. Conclusion
My goal in this paper was to offer a selective
refutation of the argument that application of an actutilitarian decision procedure to an individual situation
will necessarily result in an optimal result. It is my
belief that a more wide-sweeping refutation of this
argument is possible given unlimited space in which to
present ideas; however, given the restricted length of
this paper, I chose to focus upon a single class of games
to which this argument cannot apply. Through an
analysis of the specific class of non-communicative,
multiple-equilibria games, it is apparent that oftentimes
an act-utilitarian decision procedure is markedly
inferior to a rule-utilitarian decision procedure in terms
of the strategies suggested by each approach. However,
in order for rule-utilitarianism to truly prescribe an
optimal strategy for the player of the game, a neocontractarian position such as the one offered by
Binmore is necessary to ensure the preferability of one
of a number of equally optimal equilibria. Applied to
the “game of life,” it is my belief that further
implementation of this approach to prescriptive ethics
86

may shed light upon and serve to improve those rules
which best promote the happiness of society as a whole.
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